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		<title>Risk Management in IT: NSS</title>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Aug 2011 04:46:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Risk Management of IT: National Security Systems Risk Assessments and Risk Management will apply to National Security Systems (NSS). What is a Risk Assessment? A risk assessment is the results/process to determine the likelihood that a threat will exploit a &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/risk-management-in-it-nss/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1>Risk Management of IT: National Security Systems</h1>
<p>Risk Assessments and Risk Management will apply to National Security Systems (NSS).</p>
<h1>What is a Risk Assessment?</h1>
<p>A risk assessment is the results/process to determine the likelihood that a threat will exploit a weakness.  Risk assessment is a part of the risk management.</p>
<h1>What is risk management?</h1>
<p>Risk Management is the on-going process of determining assessing, identifying and prioritizing of risks. </p>
<p><strong>Is My System a National Security System?<br />
</strong><br />
NIST SP 800-59, Guidance for Identifying an information system as an NSS.  800-39 is a 17 page document developed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency, for identifying an information system as a national security system.  It is basised on the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).</p>
<p><strong>Who determines if you have an NSS?<br />
</strong><br />
The head of each agency is responsible for designating an agency information security official to determine which, if any, agency systems are national security systems.  </p>
<p><strong>Tools to determine if you have a NSS system:<br />
</strong><br />
National Security System Identification Checklist (NIST SP 800-59, Appendix A).  The NSS ID Checklist asks (6) questions.  Answering yes to any of these questions qualifies your system as an NSS:<br />
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve intelligence activities?<br />
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve cryptologic activities related to national security?<br />
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve command and control of military forces?<br />
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system?<br />
• Is the system critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions?<br />
• Does the system store, process, or communicate classified information?</p>
<p><strong>NSS RMF</strong><br />
The guidance of CNSSI 1253 is the result of NIST collaborated with the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) to ensure NIST SP 800-53 contains security controls to meet the requirements of National Security Systems (NSS). </p>
<p><strong>KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CNSS INSTRUCTION NO. 1253 AND NIST PUBLICATIONS<br />
</strong><br />
The key differences between CNSSI 1253 and the rest of the NIST publications is that NSS systems do not follow “high-water mark”, NSS maybe tailored through risk-based adjustment, control profiles, and a method that allows organization to practice reciprocity.</p>
<p><strong>NSS and High Water Mark</strong><br />
Both FIPS 200 and NIST 800-53 apply the concept of a high-water mark (HWM) when categorizing information systems according to the worst-case potential impact of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an information system.  This Instruction does not adopt this HWM usage. In the National Security Community, the potential impact levels determined for confidentiality, integrity, and availability are retained, meaning there are 27 possible three-value combinations for NSI or NSS, as opposed to the three possible single-value categorizations obtained using the guidelines in FIPS 200. – CNSSI 1253</p>
<p><strong>Risk-Based Adjustment</strong><br />
Potential impact-based security categorizations for NSS may be tailored through the use of a risk-based adjustment.  This adjustment takes into consideration the physical and personnel security measures already employed throughout the National Security Community and factors such as aggregation of information. </p>
<p><strong>Control Profile</strong><br />
Method by which organizations may designate sets of controls for NSS based on their enterprise-wide risk assessment and taking into account business objectives, system risks, and mission needs.</p>
<p><strong>NSS Reciprocity </strong><br />
It is the policy of the National Security Community that member organizations practice reciprocity with respect to the certification of systems and system components to the greatest extent practicable. Reciprocity of certification reduces the cost and time to implement systems and system components. </p>
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		<title>DoD Risk Management FrameWork (Part 1): Look Ahead</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Mar 2011 02:29:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[The DoD is working on using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Certification &#038; Accreditation method of assessing &#038; authorizing systems. The NIST system of C&#038;A is actually known as Risk Management Framework (RMF). This would require the &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/dod-risk-management-framework-part-1-look-ahead/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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The DoD is working on using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Certification &#038; Accreditation method of assessing &#038; authorizing systems. The NIST system of C&#038;A is actually known as Risk Management Framework (RMF).  This would require the the Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks &#038; Information Integration ASD(NII) office to move the DoDI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) controls to be mapped to the NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls.  I am not certain yet whether they will eliminate the 8500.2 or just have all departments move to the NIST SP 800-53.  They will also need to switch the DoD Information Assurance Certification &#038; Accreditation Process (DIACAP) to the NIST SP 800-37 rev 1, Risk Management Framework or something similar.  </p>
<p>If the transition is anything like their move to from DoD Information Technology Security Certification &#038; Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) to the DIACAP then they will give about 2 years for the DoD to transition.  As of Mar. 2011, there is no policy on this.  It is serious because its on the DIACAP KS and the <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/tagResults.aspx?ID=96">Department of Navy CIO</a> has been releasing information on it since 2009.  The DON CIO &#038; the ASD (NII) have been working on the project to transition from DIACAP to some sort of DoD Risk Management Framework.  So far, they have mapped the DoDI 8500.2 IA controls to the NIST SP 800-53 Controls: <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/PolicyView.aspx?ID=1447">Certification and Accreditation Transformation: Security Control Mapping</a>.  Here is a May 2010 update to the <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/PolicyView.aspx?ID=1734">NIST to DIACAP mapping</a>.  800-53 to DoD IA contols map also includes the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3 controls.  This is very telling.  The plan seems to be to have one standard for all Federal Information System.  </p>
<p>Since DoD 8510.01, DIACAP &#038; NIST SP 800-37, Risk Management Framework (RMF) cover so much of the same ground, I think the only real benefit is that reciprocity between Federal agency will be easier if all departments have one standard of risk management and one security control set.</p>
<blockquote><p>The DON uses the certification and accreditation (C&#038;A) process to assess and understand the residual risk associated with operating information systems (IS) and information technology (IT). The DON is participating with the DoD, the IC, and the rest of the Federal government in C&#038;A transformation. One goal of transformation is to achieve common security controls enabling the DON, the DoD, the IC, and the rest of the Federal government to develop systems to the same protection standards. </p>
<p>The recently released National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, revision 3 provides recommended consolidated security controls in an effort to achieve common security controls across the Federal government. </p>
<p>The DON will continue to use the DoDI 8500.2 as the authoritative source for security controls until otherwise specified. However, understanding the changes represented in NIST SP 800-53r3 will be essential as DoD and the DON begin transitioning to this new set of security controls. To support the transition, the DON CIO developed this security control mapping document to demonstrate how existing DoD and IC security controls map to the security controls recommended by the NIST SP 800-53r3 publication.</p></blockquote>
<p> &#8211;<a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=1448">Security Control Mapping Document Aids Transition</a>, <a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/Main.aspx">DON CIO Site</a></p>
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		<title>CNSSI 12-53: New Security Control Catalog for National Security Systems</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2009 05:39:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[New DIACAP Certification &#038; Accreditation IA Controls The DoD has had the same IA controls since DoD 8510.1-M, controls since DoD 8510.1-M, Department of Defense Information Technology System Certification &#038; Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), July 31, 2000 â€“ it was developed &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/cnssi-12-53-new-security-control-catalog-for-national-security-systems/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>New DIACAP Certification &#038; Accreditation IA Controls</strong></p>
<p>The DoD has had the same IA controls since DoD 8510.1-M, controls since DoD 8510.1-M, Department of Defense Information Technology System Certification &#038; Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), July 31, 2000 <em>â€“ it was developed late last century.</em></p>
<p><strong>The DoD has a total of 157 IA controls spread across 8 subject areas in 4 classes:</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>
DC â€“ Security Design &#038; Configuration</p>
<p>IA â€“ Identification and Authentication</p>
<p>EC â€“ Enclave &#038; Computing</p>
<p>EB â€“ Enclave Boundary Defense</p>
<p>PE â€“ Physical &#038; Environmental</p>
<p>PR â€“ Personnel</p>
<p>CO â€“ Continuity</p>
<p>VI â€“ Vulnerability </p></blockquote>
<p>There is a huge change coming in certification &#038; accreditation for the DoD coming.  The IA controls are being expanded and changed.  The last two DIACAP classes Iâ€™ve been to mentioned that there is a big change coming.  Essentially, all the IA Controls (security controls, safeguards, countermeasures.. whatever your organization is calling them) are getting expanded.  All federal organizations will have security controls that look more like what is in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53.  This is all being placed in the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 1253.  As of 25 June 2009, the CNSSI 1253 is still in draft. </p>
<p>The draft has 17 families &#038; identifiers in three security control classes.  </p>
<p>TABLE 1: SECURITY CONTROL CLASSES, FAMILIES, AND IDENTIFIERS<br />
IDENTIFIER FAMILY CLASS</p>
<blockquote><p>AC Access Control Technical</p>
<p>AT Awareness and Training Operational</p>
<p>AU Audit and Accountability Technical</p>
<p>CA Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments Management</p>
<p>CM Configuration Management Operational</p>
<p>CP Contingency Planning Operational</p>
<p>IA Identification and Authentication Technical</p>
<p>IR Incident Response Operational</p>
<p>MA Maintenance Operational</p>
<p>MP Media Protection Operational</p>
<p>PE Physical and Environmental Protection Operational</p>
<p>PL Planning Management</p>
<p>PS Personnel Security Operational</p>
<p>RA Risk Assessment Management</p>
<p>SA System and Services Acquisition Management</p>
<p>SC System and Communications Protection Technical</p></blockquote>
<p>The CNSSI has about 500 controls with pretty good granularity.  </p>
<p>One of the really cool thing about 1253 was the security control mapping.  Itâ€™s a table that matches up 800-53, DCID 6/3 and DODI 8500.2.</p>
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		<title>DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 4): DIACAP/AFCAP Day 4 &amp; 5</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2009 05:21:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[Days 4 &#038; 5 bring the DIACAP/AFCAP Essentials Class to a close. The biggest things I learned were: CNSSI 4009 is the the official glossary of DOD IA, there is a big difference between theory, policy and practice, Agents of &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-4-diacapafcap-day-4-5/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Days 4 &#038; 5 bring the DIACAP/AFCAP Essentials Class to a close.  The<br />
biggest things I learned were:  CNSSI 4009 is the the official glossary of DOD IA, there is a big difference between theory, policy and practice, Agents of the Certifying Authority (ACA) are official validators and there is a difference between acquisition Mission criticality and IA MAC levels.   </p>
<p><strong>Stuff I learned from people in the class:</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>-AFCA is changing its name (to what?)</p>
<p>DOD is going to put the new IA controls in NCSSI 12-53 (currently in draft)</p>
<p>-a lot of what I need in there is in NIST 800-53</p>
<p>Marines use something called Exacta</p>
<p>Site called securitycritics.org</p>
<p>33-202 is now completely irrelevant and obsolete (not even mentioned ONCE in the class)</p>
<p>800-30</p>
<p>Feds call Certification &#038;Accreditation (C&#038;A) â€œSecurity authorizationâ€ </p>
<p>NIST SP 800-37</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Day 4:</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Validator Activities &#038; Issue Accreditation Decision</p>
<p>Prepare POA&#038;M</p>
<p>Validate Results/Scorecard</p>
<p>Scorecard</p>
<p>Make certification determination</p>
<p>CA/DAA Package review </p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Day 5:</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Validation procedures were discussed.  On day five, we looked at how the validators look at a system.</p>
<p>I thought is was interesting.  It should help me get through the EITDR/DIACAP process easier.</p>
<p>Maintain Situational Awareness</p>
<p>Maintain IA Posture</p>
<p>Conduct Review</p>
<p>R-Accreditation</p>
<p>Retire system </p></blockquote>
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		<title>DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 4): DIACAP/AFCAP Day3</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2009 04:37:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[Day 3 heats up a little. We start talking about what it take to actually get validated. The DIACAP Implementers Guide &#038; the DIACAP Validators guide is opened up and reviewed. I think we all learned a little something during &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-4-diacapafcap-day3/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Day 3 heats up a little.  We start talking about what it take to actually get validated.  The DIACAP Implementers Guide &#038; the DIACAP Validators guide is opened up and reviewed.  I think we all learned a little something during this discussion because there have been some challenges with this.  Unfortunately, we don&#8217;t to far into the validator stuff.</p>
<p><strong>Day 3:</strong>  </p>
<blockquote><p>DIACAP Structure</p>
<p>Terminology Review</p>
<p>Assemble DIACAP Team</p>
<p>Registered System/System Information Profile</p>
<p>Assign IA Controls</p>
<p>Initiate DIACAP Implementation Plan </p></blockquote>
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		<title>DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 3): DIACAP/AFCAP Day2</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2009 04:32:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[Day 1 &#038; 2 have been all about the very basics of DIACAP. Were introduced to the terminologies, key players of the C&#038;A process and basically given the big picture. Like I said, GREAT for beginners, but just lots of &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-3-diacapafcap-day2/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Day <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-2-diacapafcap-day1/">1 </a>&#038; 2 have been all about the very basics of DIACAP.  Were introduced to the terminologies, key players of the C&#038;A process and basically given the big picture.  Like I said, GREAT for beginners, but just lots of theory and refresher if you&#8217;ve been doing C&#038;A since DITSCAP.</p>
<p><strong>Day 1 &#038;2: </strong> </p>
<blockquote><p>Getting the Big Picture</p>
<p>DIACAP/AFCAP Policy &#038; Terminology</p>
<p>Roles and Responsibilities for the C&#038;A process</p>
<p>Accreditation  &#038; Approval to Connect</p>
<p>Homework: review terminology  </p></blockquote>
<p>In between longer breaks, during lunch and just before class we sneak in episode of the The IT Crowd.  Its the first time I&#8217;ve watched it so its a real treat for me.  Hilarious show.  </p>
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		<title>DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 2): DIACAP/AFCAP Day1</title>
		<link>http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-2-diacapafcap-day1/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-2-diacapafcap-day1</link>
		<comments>http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-2-diacapafcap-day1/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 01:29:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[DIACAP/AFCAP Day 1. This is the second installment of the DIACAP Essentials journal. In the first day of class we&#8217;ve taken a high level look at the big picture of the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification &#038; Accreditation Process &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-2-diacapafcap-day1/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>DIACAP/AFCAP Day 1.</strong><br />
<a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-essentials-ia-control-validation-training-part-1/">This is the second installment of the DIACAP Essentials journal.</a></p>
<p>In the first day of class we&#8217;ve taken a high level look at the big picture of the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification &#038; Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and Air Force Certification &#038; Accreditation Program (AFCAP).  It is a very valuable tool for a beginner. </p>
<p>Since I&#8217;ve gone through the entire process (with a legacy system) more than once through all the growing pains of Air Force C&#038;A from DITSCAP to DIACAP, I found that I knew about 90% of everything taught.  I don&#8217;t mind having a refresher, though and quite frankly, I need the CPE&#8217;s for my CISSP <img src='http://elamb.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> .</p>
<p>There were a couple of golden nuggets that I&#8217;ve been able to get out of some of the old timers.  I learned some interesting things about how the Navy, Marines and Army do things.<br />
Navy (as weird as their dumb ass rank system.. yep, I said it.. its dumb) have like three systems: DITPR-DON, DA-DUMB and some other BS, Marines have something called Exacta and the Army has APMS (Army Profile Management System).  Also learned cool off topic stuff like history of eMass.</p>
<p>I must admit I&#8217;m looking forward to day two.<br />
pros of day 1: Good solid start on basics GREAT for beginners.  <a href="http://www.secureinfo.com/">SecureInfo</a> gets mad props for have a great instructor John M.(don&#8217;t know if he wants his full name published.. but he&#8217;s highly, highly knowledgeable and very positive).</p>
<p>cons of day 1: Right off the bat I am noticing a huge hole in the training&#8230; a lack of in depth teaching of <a href="http://elamb.org/eitdr-enterprise-information-technology-data-repository/">EITDR</a>, which is how the Air Force implements, manages and maintains the entire DIACAP/AFCAP process.  I don&#8217;t really see how you can teach one without the other these days.  I guess contractually, SecureInfo can not touch it since some other company has the contract.  But unfortunately, the folks that are new to this are going to suffer.  Because if they goto this class without knowing the EITDR they will know why but now how, and if they go to the EITDR class without knowing the DIACAP they will know how but not Why.</p>
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		<title>DIACAP Activity #1 Initiate and Plan Certification &amp; Accreditation</title>
		<link>http://elamb.org/diacap-activity-1-initiate-and-plan-certification-accreditation/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=diacap-activity-1-initiate-and-plan-certification-accreditation</link>
		<comments>http://elamb.org/diacap-activity-1-initiate-and-plan-certification-accreditation/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 03 Feb 2008 06:35:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Assurance/DIACAP]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Initiating the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification &#038; Accreditation Process (DIACAP) starts with a lot of â€œsetting up shopâ€. Registering with a DoD component, forming the IA Team and assigning IA controls (also known as IA requirements and security &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-activity-1-initiate-and-plan-certification-accreditation/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Initiating the <tag>Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification &#038; Accreditation Process </tag> (<tag>DIACAP</tag>) starts with a lot of â€œsetting up shopâ€.  Registering with a DoD component, forming the IA Team and assigning IA controls (also known as IA requirements and security controls) can be a lot of work,  but the more of these tasks you complete, the easier the rest of the process will be.</p>
<p><strong>Register the System with DoD IA Component </strong></p>
<p>Each branch of the military has an IA component. Each of the US Armed Services have a division under their respective chief information officerâ€™s responsible for all computers, communications and networks in a given military branch. These communications divisions will house the Information Assurance component responsible for the DIACAP tasks.</p>
<p><strong><em>Table 1.  DoD IA Components</em></strong></p>
<table style="border: medium none ; border-collapse: collapse" class="MsoTableGrid" border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
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<td style="border: 1pt solid windowtext; padding: 0in 5.4pt; background: #e6e6e6 none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial; width: 63.9pt" width="85"><strong><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">DoD Branch<o:p></o:p></font></font></strong></td>
<td style="border-style: solid solid solid none; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext #ece9d8; border-width: 1pt 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; background: #e6e6e6 none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial; width: 144.85pt" width="193"><strong><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Branch Communication &amp; Information Service<o:p></o:p></font></font></strong></td>
<td style="border-style: solid solid solid none; border-color: windowtext windowtext windowtext #ece9d8; border-width: 1pt 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; background: #e6e6e6 none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial; width: 188.25pt" width="251"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman"><st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on"><strong>Branch</strong></st1:city><strong> <st1:state w:st="on">IA</st1:state></strong></st1:place><strong> Component<o:p></o:p></strong></font></font></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid; border-color: #ece9d8 windowtext windowtext; border-width: medium 1pt 1pt; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 63.9pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="85"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">US Air Force<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid none; border-color: rgb(236, 233, 216) windowtext windowtext rgb(236, 233, 216); border-width: medium 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 144.85pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="193"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Air Force Communication Agency (AFCA)<o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">http://public.afca.af.mil/<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid none; border-color: rgb(236, 233, 216) windowtext windowtext rgb(236, 233, 216); border-width: medium 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 188.25pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="251"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">AFCA/EV<o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Assessment and Validators<o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">http://public.afca.af.mil/library/<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid; border-color: #ece9d8 windowtext windowtext; border-width: medium 1pt 1pt; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 63.9pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="85"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">US Army <o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid none; border-color: rgb(236, 233, 216) windowtext windowtext rgb(236, 233, 216); border-width: medium 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 144.85pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="193"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">*Army NETCOM 9<sup>th</sup> Signal Corps <o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">http://www.netcom.army.mil/<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid none; border-color: rgb(236, 233, 216) windowtext windowtext rgb(236, 233, 216); border-width: medium 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 188.25pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="251"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Army NETCOM Information Assurance Office<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid; border-color: #ece9d8 windowtext windowtext; border-width: medium 1pt 1pt; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 63.9pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="85"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Department of the Navy<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid none; border-color: rgb(236, 233, 216) windowtext windowtext rgb(236, 233, 216); border-width: medium 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 144.85pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="193"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">DON CIO<o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">DON Information Management and Information Technology (IM/IT)<o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">http://www.doncio.navy.mil<o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
<td style="border-style: none solid solid none; border-color: rgb(236, 233, 216) windowtext windowtext rgb(236, 233, 216); border-width: medium 1pt 1pt medium; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 188.25pt; background-color: transparent" valign="top" width="251"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">DON SIAO<o:p></o:p></font></font><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.doncio.navy.mil/Main.aspx">http://www.doncio.navy.mil/Main.aspx</a><o:p></o:p></font></font></td>
</tr>
</table>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Times New Roman">*more on <a href="http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0OBA/is_4_22/ai_n8704549/pg_2" title="Army Netcom">Army NETCOM</a> </font><a href="http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0OBA/is_4_22/ai_n8704549/pg_2"></a></p>
<p>More on <a href="http://elamb.org/register-the-system-with-dod-ia-component/">Registering with your IA Component</a><br />
<a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-team/" title="DIACAP TEAM"><strong>DIACAP Team</strong></a></p>
<p>Once youâ€™ve made contact with your systemâ€™s IA Component you may be asked to identify the players in your DIACAP Team.  The DIACAP Team roles will consist of a Designated Approval Authority (DAA), Program Manager (PM), Certifying Authority (CA), User Rep, Information Assurance Manager and others.  You will also need to identify other important players such as the Lead Engineer.</p>
<p><strong>More on <a href="http://elamb.org/diacap-team/" title="DIACAP TEAM" target="_blank">DIACAP Team Roles</a></strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Get an Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service (eMASS) account</strong></p>
<p>The Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service (eMASS) is a generic name for specific automated databases that are used to manage the DIACAP.  Each branch has a different automated database (Fig 1). The USAF has the EITDR, The Navy has the DITPR-DON, and the Army has the APMS. Each of these databases satisfies DoD IT portfolio management, certification and IT reporting directives addressed in DoD Directive 8115.01, signed October 10, 2005.</p>
<p><strong><em><font face="Arial" size="2">Fig 1, DoD IT Portfolio Management System</font><font face="Arial" size="2"><img src="http://google.com/pr" border="0" height="1" width="1" /></font></em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center"><img src="http://elamb.org/hacked/images/emass.jpg" alt="eMASS IT Portfolio Management System" height="278" width="373" /></p>
<p><strong><a href="http://elamb.org/enterprise-mission-assurance-support-service-emass/" title="eMASS IT Portfolio Management"><font face="Arial" size="2">More on the eMASS systems.</font></a></strong></p>
<p><strong><a name="assigniacontrols">Assign IA Controls</a></strong></p>
<p>Information Assurance Controls are also known as Information Assurance requirements and security controls. IA Controls are assigned according to a systemâ€™s Mission Assurance Category (MAC) and Confidentiality Levels (Fig 2.) defined in DoDI 8500.2.  The <a href="https://diacap.iaportal.navy.mil/" title="DIACAP Knowledge Service">DIACAP Knowledge Service </a>has Excel spread sheets breaking down each of the IA Controls.</p>
<p><em><strong>Fig. 2, Mission Assurance Category &amp; Confidentiality Levels</strong></em></p>
<p align="center"><img src="http://elamb.org/hacked/images/MAC_level.jpg" alt="Mission Assurance Category (MAC) Confidentiality Levels" height="182" width="300" /></p>
<p>Some of the IA Controls require system security engineering interpretation because no system is alike. Some IA Controls will not apply while other will apply only under certain circumstances and that is where knowledgeable system &amp; system security engineer comes in.</p>
<p>Ref:</p>
<p><a href="https://akss.dau.mil/dag/GuideBook/IG_c7.5.7.2.asp" target="_blank">https://akss.dau.mil/dag/GuideBook/IG_c7.5.7.2.asp</a></p>
<p>DoDI 8500.2, Enclosure 4</p>
<p><strong><a name="initiatediacap">Initiate DIACAP Implementation Plan</a></strong></p>
<p>With the proper MAC/CL level applied, the system security specialist/engineer and/or technician should have a good idea what IA Controls apply to a given system. The next step is to begin the DIACAP Implementation Plan.</p>
<p>The DIACAP Knowledge Service has a thorough break down of each of the IA Controls and how to accomplish and validate them. Once complete, your systemâ€™s DIACAP Implementation Plan should identify each of the applicable IA Controls, whether the system is compliant or not and when it will be compliant with those particular IA Controls.</p>
<p>Initiation of the DIACAP Plan means you are consulting developers and or Program Managers on the IA Controls that will affect the system. Both new systems, and existing legacy systems will require some sort of documentation whether a simple spreadsheet, or Word document detailing who, what, when and where of each IA Control feature applied to the system. The DIACAP Knowledge Service has a sample DIACAP Implementation Plan spread sheet that thoroughly details all the above requirements. It can be downloaded and tailored easily to your specific systems needs.</p>
<p>Once registered, the eMASS (EITDR, DITPR-DON, and APFM) system will require that you upload your completed DIACAP Implementation Plan (which is a bit of a paradox because the EITDR can actually create a DIACAP package once certain data is uploaded, validated and approved. EITDR will also require that the IA Controls be addressed and validated individually and subsequently Reviewed, Validated and Approved by system stakeholders.</p>
<p><strong>Deliverables for Activity #1:</strong><strong>DIACAP System Identification Profile (SIP)</strong></p>
<p>DIACAP Implementation Plan</p>
<p>USAF SISSU Stakeholderâ€™s List (Air Force)</p>
<p align="center"><strong>References:</strong></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/520001.htm">DoD Regulation 5200.1-R , â€œDoD Information Security Program,â€ January 1997</a></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/811501.htm">DoDD 8115.01, &#8220;Information Technology Portfolio Management&#8221;, dated October 10, 2005</a></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001p.pdf">DoDD 8500.01E, &#8220;Information Assurance (IA),&#8221; dated April 23, 2007</a></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="https://ia.gordon.army.mil/docs/85101m.pdf" title="DITSCAP, DOD 8510.1-M">DoD 8510.1-M, â€œDoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) Application Documentâ€, dated July 31, 2000</a></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle">DoDI 8551.1, &#8220;Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) Release 6.9,&#8221; dated September, 2007</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/857001p.pdf" title="8570 IA Training Certification Workforce Management">DoDD 8570.1, &#8220;Information Assurance Training, Certification, and Workforce Management,&#8221; dated August 15, 2004</a></span></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/857001m.htm">DoDI 8570.1-M â€œInformation Assurance Workforce Improvement Program,â€ dated December 19, 2005</a></span></span></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/memos/itpm.pdf" title="IT Portfolio Management">Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, â€œInformation Technology Portfolio Management,â€ March 22, 2004</a></span></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf">Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) (2002)</a></span></span></span></p>
<p><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><span class="ms-announcementtitle"><a href="http://iase.disa.mil/">Information Assurance Support Environment (IASE)</a></span></span></span></span></p>
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		<title>NR-KPP stands for Net Ready Key Performance Parameters</title>
		<link>http://elamb.org/nr-kpp-stands-for-net-ready-key-performance-parameters/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=nr-kpp-stands-for-net-ready-key-performance-parameters</link>
		<comments>http://elamb.org/nr-kpp-stands-for-net-ready-key-performance-parameters/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Sep 2005 20:44:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[NR-KPP stands for Net Ready Key Performance Parameters. Net Ready is the ability to have immediate access to mission or business essential information. Like the term Netcentric, Net Readiness is the full exploitation of the Internet and/or Intranet whether the &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/nr-kpp-stands-for-net-ready-key-performance-parameters/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><font>NR-KPP stands for Net Ready Key Performance Parameters.</font> <br />Net Ready is the ability to have immediate access to mission or business essential information. Like the term Netcentric, Net Readiness is the full exploitation of the Internet and/or Intranet whether the organization&#39;s primary mission is business, volunteerism or warfare. </p>
<p>So Net Ready Key Performance Parameters refers to evaluating the &#8220;net readiness&#8221; of a given information system or organization. </p>
<p><font>Formal Definition: </font><br />NR-KPP was developed to assess net-ready attributes required for both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange. The NR-KPP replaces the Interoperability KPP, and incorporates net-centric concepts for achieving Information Technology (IT) and National Security System (NSS) interoperability and supportability. </p>
<p><font>What are the elements within the Net Ready Key Performance Parameters?</font> </p>
<p>Net Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model (NCOW RM) Compliance Statement </p>
<p>Information Assurance (IA) Accreditation Compliance Statement </p>
<p>Your guide on creating the NR-KPP will be the CJCSI 6212, Interoperability and Supportability on National Security Systems: </p>
<p>Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter. All Information Support Plans (ISP) for systems that exchange information with other systems will contain a Net-Ready KPP. For all ISPs with an associated approved JCIDS CDD or CPD capabilities document, the ISP can refer to the associated CDD/CPD. ISPs for CRDs, ORDs, non-ACAT and fielded systems will include the NR-KPP in the ISP. </p>
<p><font>The NR-KPP will consist of the following:</font> <br />a. AV-1, OV-2, OV-4, OV-5, OV-6C <br />b. SV-4, SV-5, SV-6 <br />c. TV-1 generated from DISR online <br />d. Applicable CRD crosswalk (See Table D-3) <br />e. Initial LISI Profile (Interface Requirements Profile) See Enclosure K <br />f. NR-KPP statement. (Table I-1) <br />g. IA Statement of Compliance <br />h. Key Interface Profile (KIP) Declaration (list of the KIPS that apply to <br />the system) </p>
<p>Key Interface Profiles (KIPs) Compliance Statement </p>
<p><font>Reference: </font><br />CJCSI 6212, Interoperability and Supportability on National Security Systems <br />&#223; http://www.teao.saic.com/cbrtraining/docs/CJCSI_6212_01.pdf </p>
<p>Net Ready -&gt; http://del.icio.us/tag/%22net%2Bready%22 <br />More on NR-KPP &#224; http://del.icio.us/tag/%22nr%2Bkpp%22 </p>
<p>http://del.icio.us/rss/tag/netcentric</p></div>
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		<title>ISP Architectural Views</title>
		<link>http://elamb.org/isp-architectural-views/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=isp-architectural-views</link>
		<comments>http://elamb.org/isp-architectural-views/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2005 11:20:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>elamb.security</dc:creator>
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		<category><![CDATA[Assurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assurance/Netcentric]]></category>

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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://elamb.org/?p=185</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[One the most important part of an Information Support Plan(previously known as a C4ISP) is the Architectural Views.The DoD Architectural Framework Document describes each veiwin painful, painful detail. Since the C4ISP has beenchanged into the ISP, the DoD Architectural Framework &#8230; <a href="http://elamb.org/isp-architectural-views/">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<pre>One the most important part of an Information Support Plan(previously known as a C4ISP) is the Architectural Views.The <a href="http://www.aitcnet.org/dodfw/">DoD Architectural Framework</a> Document describes each veiwin painful, painful detail.  Since the C4ISP has beenchanged into the ISP, the DoD Architectural Framework is abit out dated.  For example it doesn&#39;t mention "ISP" andalso includes some old views that have been phased out suchas OV-3 and SV-1.  The following gives my view on some ofthe views.

In my limited experience creating views is very interativeprocess. Meaning you create a little then your tweak andchange them as you go.

AV-1 Overview and Summary Information is a breeze if youhave all the appropriate information readily available.

<font>Operation Views (OV)</font>These are fun for me because I feel like I understandthem.  OV-1, High-level Operational Concept Graphic isone that I&#39;ve had the pleasure of not having to do. Merely starting it was a bit of a challenge.  It isintended to look pretty. I&#39;ve seen it done affectivelywith MS Word and PowerPoint.

OV-2 is Operation Node Connectivity.  As a network guy,this is my favorite.  I use Visio for this one withsimple shapes representing the nodes or you can getfancy and use computer Icons OV-4, OrganizationalRelationship Chart is another fun easy diagram that canbe created with Visio or Word using simple shapes. Ov-5 is the Activity Model.  Since it is so closelytied to SV-4, fuctional description and SV-5,Operational Activity to System Function TraceabilityMatrix, it is very, very interative and not one of myfavorites. I complete these three one after another. Both SV-4 and OV-5 must be completed before you do SV-5since all the info in SV-5 comes from those two.OV-6c, Operational Events-Trade Description requires avery good understanding of what happens to the dataupon entering the system.  But once you have thatnailed down it is fairly straight forward.  The logicaldata model, OV-7, can get a bit convoluted, I imagine. In it you are supposed give a visual representation ofthe various domains.

<font>System Views (SV)</font>The SV&#39;s can get a little gray as some of the views cantouch on things that involve your system but you haveperhaps only heard of.  For example, if your system "A"connects with System "B" you may have to show thatconnection even though you don&#39;t know much of anythingabout System "B". I haven&#39;t seen SV-1 on the <a href="http://www.teao.saic.com/cbrtraining/archpro01.asp">Teao Saic</a>site so I assume it has been phased out. But it dealswith Interfaces.  SV-2, System Communication Descriptionis very much like the example of system "A" in relationto "B".  SV-2 shows how your system communicates/connectswith other systems.  Its almost like a birds eye veiw ofOV-2. SV-4, System Functionality Description, like I saidin the OV section closely related to OV-5 and SV-5.  Soif one changes, they may all have to change.SV-5 is a large table that shows the direct relationshipbetween Operational Activity to System Function.  It is apain in the ass for reason stated above. SV-6 can be avery complex table.  It is the System Data ExchangeMatrix.. you&#39;ll note that anything with the word "matrix"in it sucks.  That is because one change on a seperateveiw can affect change in other views and almost alwaysincludes the matrices.

<font>Technical View (TV)</font>TV-1, Technical Standards merely lists all the capabilitiesof the system and references each of the technical standardsused.

That is my oppinion of the ISP views.  I hope you find them as relatively painlessas I did and if not this site will help you out ---&gt;<a href="http://www.teao.saic.com/cbrtraining/archpro01.asp">http://www.teao.saic.com/cbrtraining/archpro01.asp</a></pre>
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